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We have highlighted that when agents minimise free energy across long temporal horizons, this naturally
induces information-seeking (Dark Room escaping) behaviour. What does minimising free energy into the
future mean? The idea is to conceptualise inference as operating over sequences of observations, states,
and actions extending into the future. This leads to an imperative to minimise expected free energy, which
quantifies the total free energy of a sequence of observations and actions.
Mathematically, the expected free energy can be expressed in several ways (through different free-energy func-
tionals) [9]; each of which can be decomposed into instrumental terms, which promote the immediate
fulfilment of prior beliefs, and – crucially –epistemic terms, which promote exploration of novel environmental
contingencies. Importantly these epistemic terms arise naturally out of the mathematical formalism, instead of
being bolted on ad hoc, and they only arise when performing inference over temporally extended sequences.
This is because the epistemic terms function as Bayes-optimal mediators of the trade-off between short and
long-term free-energy minimisation. Moreover, the properties of different free-energy functionals can be
distinguished and tested empirically, thus leading to testable predictions about the specific functionals that best
describe agents' behaviour when they escape from Dark Rooms.Letter
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Sun and Firestone [1] presented a challenge
to predictive processing (PP) accounts
of brain function by reviving the Dark
Room problem – the idea that if agents are
mandated to minimise prediction error, the
best thing for them to do is to seek out
highly predictable environments where
nothing changes, and stay there. They
argued that standard responses to this
challenge have the potential to render the
PP account untestable and explanatorily
empty. We disagree.
One standard response is that Dark Room
type environments are intrinsically surprising,
given the homeostatic imperatives of living
organisms. One might worry that this re-
sponse solves nothing, since it merely rede-
fines what counts as ‘surprising’ for an
agent. The reply by Van de Cruys and col-
leagues relieves us of this worry by highlight-
ing the principled role of ‘optimistic
predictions’ in driving actions [2].
A second, and related, response is that
increasing prediction error in the short
term – for example, by leaving a Dark
Room to engage in curious exploration –
may help to reduce prediction error in the
long run. Sun and Firestone argued that
this response is also inadequate because
‘not all motivations that drive us from Dark
Rooms reduce to instrumentally valuable
exploration, even over the long-term’ [1].
To support their point, they noted that
some distinctive – though rare – human
behaviours, such as riding rollercoastersand reading poetry, do not seem to deliver
instrumental (goal-oriented) benefit, even
over the long-term. Fortunately, this objec-
tion loses its force when the role of action
is properly taken into consideration, as
exemplified by active inference formulations
of PP [3,4].
Action holds a special position in active
inference. Unlike inferences about sensory
states and internal states, (proprioceptive)
inferences leading to actions can directly
change the environment. From the per-
spective of the agent, sequences of
actions thus change the future. Given
that an agent is compelled to minimise
long-term prediction error, it is therefore
also mandated to reduce its uncertainty
about the world, so that it can better mini-
mise the discrepancy between expected
and actual sensory data across temporally
extended sequences of actions. Such an
agent will therefore engage in epistemic,
information-seeking actions – such as
leaving a Dark Room – even though such
actions may transiently increase short-
term prediction error. In short, in order to
minimise surprise in the future, an agent
needs to be a curious, sensation-seeking
agent in the present.
Why does this response not fall foul of Sun
and Firestone’s critique that it simply rede-
fines what is surprising? The reason is that
minimisation of long-term prediction error
can be formalised in a way that makesTrspecific, testable predictions. The formalism
that makes this possible is the free energy
principle (FEP.). The FEP generalises PP to
propose that organisms minimise the free-
energy, a tractable (i.e., measurable from
the perspective of the agent) upper-bound
on the long-term average of sensory
entropy, which generalises the notion of
prediction error.
When it comes to Dark Rooms, agents
must minimise free energy over long
temporal horizons – over the long term.
Mathematically, this means that agents
must minimize not free energy per se,
but the expected free energy – a quantity
that can be formalized in various ways
(Box 1). Minimising expected free energy
entails minimising a (negative) expected
information gain term, which rewards
sampling those novel environmental states
that (are predicted to) induce a large
divergence between prior and posterior
beliefs. This is why long-term free-
energy-minimising agents are intrinsically
drawn towards novel experiences (and
thus out of Dark Rooms) that reduce
uncertainty about the world, even at the
expense of temporarily higher prediction
error. Importantly, the free-energy func-
tional (a function of a function) intrinsically
balances this trade-off between immediate
and long-term free-energy minimisation.
Formalising the situation in this way leads
to testable hypotheses. For example, byends in Cognitive Sciences, Month 2020, Vol. xx, No. xx 1
Trends in Cognitive Sciencesperforming variational inference in compu-
tational models that have parameters
corresponding to beliefs about actions,
one can make specific predictions about
epistemic actions such as eye movements
[5]. By incorporating learning, one can also
make predictions about the biases that
may accrue to an agent’s beliefs about
the world, as it attempts to minimise
expected free energy [6]. By reconstruing
goals and rewards as prior expectations,
these models can also make fine-grained
predictions about the dynamics of re-
inforcement learning [7].
Will this approach extend to explain
rollercoaster riding and poetry reading?
In the details, perhaps not. But this is not
a failure, nor is it – as Sun and Firestone
suggested – a concern over the explana-
tory reach of PP and the FEP. Here, it is2 Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Month 2020, Vol. xx, No. xximportant to recognise that the FEP is a
framework, not a testable hypothesis in
and of itself. The lasting value of the FEP
lies in the fecundity with which it generates
virtuous circles of testable hypotheses –
such as those deriving from models of
expected free energy – and not with any
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